Göktan, Mehmet Gökhan

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M. G. GOKTAN
Göktan, M.
M. Gokhan Goktan
GOKTAN Mehmet Gokhan
Göktan, G.
M. Gökhan Göktan
Göktan Mehmet Gökhan
M. G. GÖKTAN
Goktan, Gökhan
Mehmet Gokhan GOKTAN
M. G. Goktan
Mehmet Gökhan, Göktan
Goktan, M.
Goktan, Gokhan
Göktan, Gökhan
Göktan, Mehmet
Mehmet Gökhan Göktan
Goktan, G.
Goktan Mehmet Gokhan
Mehmet G. Göktan
M. G. Göktan
Mehmet G. Goktan
GÖKTAN Mehmet Gökhan
Mehmet Gokhan Goktan
Mehmet Gökhan GÖKTAN
Göktan, Mehmet Gökhan
Goktan, Mehmet
Goktan, Mehmet Gokhan
Goktan, Mehmet Gokhan
Job Title
Dr.Öğr.Üyesi
Email Address
mehmet.goktan@okan.edu.tr
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Scholarly Output

2

Articles

2

Citation Count

0

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0

Scholarly Output Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Article
    Citation Count: 5
    On the explanation of the Lucas Paradox
    (Elsevier Science Sa, 2015) Göktan, Mehmet Gökhan; Ekonomi ve Finans / Economy and Finance
    This paper demonstrates that institutional quality provides a full explanation to the Lucas Paradox when country heterogeneity is controlled. Furthermore, in terms of the explanation of the paradox, quantile regression estimates reveal that foreign flows are driven by theoretical explanations at the lower tail, despite that they are significantly affected by growth prospects towards the higher tail. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
  • Article
    Citation Count: 0
    Insider trading on Ottoman sovereign default: The Ottoman General Debt Bond at European and Istanbul financial markets
    (Academic Press inc Elsevier Science, 2022) Göktan, Mehmet Gökhan; Hanedar, Elmas Yaldiz; Goktan, Mehmet Gokhan; Ekonomi ve Finans / Economy and Finance
    Using efficient market hypothesis and structural break frameworks, this paper examines insider trading during the Ottoman sovereign default, as historical narratives claim information leakage. If the narratives were true, informed traders would sell the Ottoman government's bonds to avoid excessive losses before the default, creating a negative price shock in case of market inefficiency. This paper employs the Ottoman General Debt Bond prices in Istanbul, London, and Paris compiled from Ottoman and European newspapers. The results do not confirm price shocks just before the sovereign default announcement. Thus, investors seem to have anticipated the default before its official declaration.